

















































This report presents the final status of the study on modelling Airport Economic Value. 
 
This study was commissioned by the Airport Research Unit of EUROCONTROL to the University of 
Westminster supported by Innaxis as part of its contribution to SESAR Operational Focus Area 
(OFA) 05.01.01 entitled ‘Airport Operations Management’, in relation to the development of the 
AirPort Operations Centre (APOC) concept. 
 
The objective of the study is to extrapolate the model used for capacity planning of en-route ACC 
centres to airports with a view to evaluate the optimum airport economic value, based on several 
cost functions and quality of service evaluations. 
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Executive Summary
The primary objective of the Airport Economic Value project is to assess the value
of additional passengers or additional capacity at an airport. It aims to qualify and
quantify the main relationships and trade-offs between capacity, quality of service and
profitability. This study provides a better understanding of the interdependencies
of various KPIs and assesses the existence and behaviour of an airport economic
optimum, in a similar way to the early 2000s, when estimating the economic en-route
capacity optimum.
In order to do this, the project builds a functional model based on supply and
demand curves. The implementation follows a data-driven approach. The modelling
decisions are supported by a literature review and data analysis only; the latter encom-
passes multiple techniques from knowledge discovery, clustering and factor analysis,
among others. Most of the more technical details have been presented in annexes.
This report presents the final model, the data analysis performed to support it,
and a review of the literature and data availability. The aim is to present the work
that led to the implementation of the model, the results obtained during the design
process, the model itself, including its assumptions, and some key results obtained as
model outputs.
The baseline year for the analyses is 2014. Operational and traffic data (from
FlightGlobal and EUROCONTROL) and passenger data (from ACI EUROPE) both
relate to this reference year. Obtaining 2014 financial data proved less straightforward
than anticipated. FlightGlobal was still citing 2013 data for many airports. It was
also necessary to extend the depth of the data, such that it was decided to use 2013
financial data from the Air Transport Research Society for all the analyses, as a
proxy for 2014: ATRS only had 2013 data available at the time of the data analysis.
For this initial model, it was only necessary to establish fundamental relationships
between the data fields. Any obvious shortcomings regarding the financial data have
been monitored and flagged.
‘Soft management’ and ‘hard infrastructures’ are considered for capacity increases.
The literature review identifies many of the key potential trade-offs relevant to this
research. It discusses the implications of delays at airports and the various approaches
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different airports can adopt to increase their capacity. It considers key airport man-
agement issues such as non-aeronautical revenue generation and service quality.
The review also covers the complex area of airport charging/economic regulation
and the wider consequences for airline network planning, identifying the difficulties
involved with including such factors in any trade-off analysis.
Data availability is discussed. A small number of metrics and mechanisms are
selected. Several data analysis techniques are identified which have been used to guide
the modelling process, including principal components analysis (PCA) combined with
cluster analysis. This unsupervised cluster analysis has confirmed, quantitatively, the
usual qualitative distinction between airports, with primary and secondary hubs, etc.
These clusters are then used in the model. The assumptions and the mechanisms of
the model are described in detail, as well as the calibration process. To our knowledge,
this is the first time that such a very wide range of data – in particular, economic
and financial data – have been synthesised in one database and used to characterise
airport performance.
The considerations from the literature review and data analysis lead to several
conclusions. First, it is important to have a model which can be differentiated based
on the type of airport considered. Second, the impact of delay on the airport results
from airlines being less willing to operate a route because of the corresponding costs
they incur. Third, uncertainty means that even levels of traffic under the theoreti-
cal airport capacity can imply some delay, and that the mean average delay is not
a sufficient measure for consideration. Fourth, the modelling of the decision-making
process of the airport cannot take into account changes in airport charges, but merely
comparisons of the marginal operational cost of some extra capacity with the increase
in demand due to decreased delays. Finally, the passenger perspective should not be
directly modelled, because passenger choice of airport is largely independent of factors
that can be influenced by the airport.
It is demonstrated that the model can be easily calibrated on real data and runs
very well for the airports in the dataset. It produces reliable and realistic results.
The fully calibrated results show the presence of a trade-off between the cost of extra
capacity and the increase in the number of flights operated. As a consequence, airports
usually have a maximum in their net income as a function of capacity, as shown in
Figure 1. This maximum usually implies that the average delay at an airport is non-
zero, i.e. that an airport operates slightly above its capacity. This is analogous to
the situation for en-route delays. This airport delay can be further reduced by higher
load factors and a better peak/off-peak traffic balance.
All the airports exhibit a maximum in net income as a function of capacity, if the
marginal cost of operating extra capacity is sufficiently low. This threshold in the
marginal cost is, however, rather different across airports, and only a few airports can
8
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Figure 1: Maximum of airport net income as a function of its capacity (shown
in blue), and the corresponding average delay per flight (shown in red). These
results arise from a calibration of the model on a major European hub.
sustain a high cost of capacity: these are the largest and most congested airports,
which clearly need extra capacity. This threshold is roughly consistent with the air-
ports’ current operational cost of capacity, which means that they should be able to
manage this growth, subject to the availability of investment.
More exploratory results show that the picture can be significantly modified by
the introduction of variable, non-aeronautical revenues per passenger. When tenden-
cies to ‘shop more with more time’ and ‘shop better with increased satisfaction’ are
introduced, the net income can exhibit different maxima and minima. The direct con-
sequence is that an airport would probably not be willing (or able) to invest sufficient
capital to reach the global maximum, and is likely to be ‘trapped’ in a local maximum.
Since an increase in capacity is incremental (e.g. new runway, new terminal), this may
actually render it impractical for the airport to reach any maximum.
The tool developed in this project could be used for various applications. First,
with more detailed airline and passenger data, it could be used as a decision-making
support tool for new investments at an airport. For example, the tool could easily
show if new infrastructures are needed at congested airports, or if incentives to airlines
should be developed for higher load factors. Moreover, it is easy to use and features
a Graphical User Interface (GUI), as shown on Figure 2, which allows to explore
interactively the model.
The tool could also be used by regulators to drive the adoption of new regulations
for different groups of airports, based on the results of the model and the cluster
9
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Figure 2: Screenshot of the Graphical User Interface to the model.
analysis.
It is also planned that the tool will be expanded and refined. In particular, the
heterogeneity of business models among airlines needs to be taken into account in
order to have a more reliable estimation of their reaction towards the cost of delay.
Moreover, airlines base such decisions on at least two airports (destination and arrival),
if not on several at once (assessing network effects and benefits). This needs to be
taken into account in a broader model featuring different kinds of airports and their
relationships.
Further collaboration with specific airports and ACI EUROPE are also planned.
In particular, better and more detailed data will lead to tailored airport models,
improving the prediction capacities of the present model.
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1 Introduction and objectives
The primary objective of the Airport Economic Value project is to assess the value
of additional passengers or additional capacity at an airport. It aims to qualify and
quantify the main relationships and trade-offs between capacity, quality of service and
profitability. The purpose of the project is to produce a model capable of capturing
the consequences of the decisions taken by different types of airports, for example
regarding possible expansion.
In order to do this, the project builds a functional model based on supply and de-
mand curves and utility theory embedding causal relationships. Although the Airport
Economic Value model started from a theoretical perspective, the implementation fol-
lows a data-driven approach. All modelling decisions are ultimately supported by
data and data analysis only; this encompasses multiple techniques from knowledge
discovery, clustering and factor analysis, among others.
Decisions at the airport are typically based on capacity considerations (both for
airlines and passengers), management processes, profitability of added passengers or
airlines, and future demand. These decisions result in multiple consequences for air-
lines and for passengers, which adapt their behaviour to the new environment provided
by the airport. Moreover, the airport usually has to deal with considerable uncertainty
regarding the demand, due to the long-term time frame of the decisions. Airport ex-
pectations are thus highly important for the model as they shape the future in which
the consequences of their actions will be manifested. The final model of the Air-
port Economic Value project is able to answer very specific questions related to these
mechanisms, such as the economic viability of the construction of a new runway at
a given airport based on several parameters, such as the size of the airport and the
requirements of the airport and airlines.
This deliverable presents the final model, the data analysis performed to support
its creation, and the review of the literature and data availability. The aim is to
present work which leads to the implementation of the model, results obtained during
the design process, the model itself with all its assumptions, and some key results
obtained from the model. The main text is intentionally concise. Further material
can be found in the annexes, such as full tables and equations.
The report is organised as follows. Section 2 provides the literature and data
11
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review. Section 3 then details the building process of the model, including the main
results of the final data analysis. This is followed by Section 4 which presents a short
overview of the technical implementation of the model, followed by some key results
obtained with the model. We finally summarise the lessons learnt from the model, and
its possible applications, in Section 5. The annexes contain the full technical details
related to data analysis and the model.
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2 Literature and data availability reviews
2.1 Literature review
Summary
This section reviews the academic and industry literature re-
lated to the Airport Economic Value concept by discussing the
implications of airport delays and the options for capacity ex-
pansion. The main mechanisms of relevance are ‘soft manage-
ment’ processes (such as price schemes, slot allocation strate-
gies, etc.) and ‘hard management’ processes (such as infras-
tructure improvement). The main variables to consider include:
capacity utilisation; traffic mix; aircraft occupation; ‘Net Basic
Utility’ (revenues taking the cost of delay into account); the
value of time of passengers; the share of domestic flights; and,
all metrics related to the infrastructures of airports (e.g. the
number of runways).
2.1.1 The implications of airport congestion and delays
Excess capacity will create minimal delays but will be unprofitable for airports, which
will be incentivised to utilise their facilities as much as they can, since a significant
proportion of their operating costs are fixed, giving a relatively low cost elasticity (0.27
(US) [1] and 0.3-0.5 (UK) [2]). Excess demand will produce delay costs for airlines
and passengers [3]. Some airports will pay service-level rebates to airlines when delays
and congestion occurs (4-7% of airport charges at Heathrow and Paris [4], [5]).
The delays will mean that passengers spend longer at the airport and, assuming
that this translates into additional dwell time to use for commercial purchases, this
can be viewed as a positive externality of congestion [6] This is supported by evidence
that shows that there is a favourable influence of dwell time on passenger spending
13
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[7], [8], [9] with time pressures having a detrimental impact [10]. However, a negative
relationship between unit commercial revenues and passengers has also been found,
arguably due to congestion discouraging sales [11] [12] [13]. No direct significant
relationship between commercial revenues and delayed flights has been found [11]
although it has been argued that congestion in the terminal should be differentiated
from congestion on the runways, since passengers cannot control their time to take-off
or shop whilst the aircraft is queuing, whilst they can choose when to arrive at the
airport [14].
Airport passenger satisfaction, which is likely to drop with congestion and delays,
may also influence commercial spend. At a global level a 1% increase in passenger
satisfaction scores is associated with a 1.5% growth in commercial revenues [15] So
even though greater satisfaction may not directly influence passenger airport choice
(this being driven more by locational factors and airline fare/service preferences [16])
it may help airport profitability by enhancing commercial revenues. The resulting
relationship between satisfaction and profitability has not always been confirmed [17]
as research here is very scarce because of the lack of appropriate and publicly available
satisfaction data.
2.1.2 Soft management options
In trying to match more closely demand and capacity, the literature discusses two
main options for airports. First, there are so-called ‘soft’ management approaches,
that tend to be quick to implement, potentially low cost, but limited in scope as
they do not involve any major changes to the physical infrastructure. ‘Hard’ options,
by contrast, are slow to implement and expensive. These can yield large increases
in capacity, because they are lumpy and are made infrequently in relatively large,
indivisible units. These two approaches are simultaneously considered by airports,
and lead to a two stage optimisation, as shown in [18], with different time frames.
The soft options can relate to both strategic planning and tactical adjustments
[19]. In the broadest sense, these can include substituting short-distance air travel with
high-speed trains, diverting traffic to other airports or using multi-airport systems [20].
Related to the airport itself, options may be infrastructure improvement planning [21],
[22], changing the ATC rules, and reorganising traffic to make better off-peak use of
facilities, or by using aircraft with higher seat capacity, even though this may lead to
additional congestion in the terminals [23], [24].
On the demand side, a major consideration is whether congestion or peak pricing
can be used to manage the traffic. This has been discussed in depth in theory [25]
particularly related to the ability of dominant carriers with market power (rather than
being atomistic in perfect competition) to internalise the congestion costs. Potentially,
peak pricing would push up airline and passenger costs, and bring extra revenues
to the airport, (assuming that it is not introduced in a revenue-neutral manner).
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However, in practice, peak pricing has proved difficult to implement and is unpopular
with airlines, particularly since it is viewed as unfairly discriminatory and considered
ineffectual in changing behaviour because of complex scheduling operations and slot
allocation constraints [26].
Relating congestion pricing to passenger value of time, theoretical research has
demonstrated that business passengers, exhibiting a greater value, would benefit from
higher charges to protect them from excessive congestion caused by leisure passengers
with a lower relative value of time [27] [14] and the optimal airport charge would be
higher than if passengers were treated as a single type [6]. However in practice airports
do not discriminate between business and leisure passengers in their pricing, and even
using airline models types as a proxy (e.g. full service carrier - FSCs, low cost carriers
- LCCs) does not hold really true in today’s environment as the distinction between
the markets for these two types of airlines is becoming increasingly blurred.
In the short-term, any changes in prices to reflect congestion may not be possible
if the airport is subject to economic regulation, especially incentive regulation, which
typically places limits on the price increases which are allowed [28]. An alternative
demand management technique, frequently researched [29] [30] and independent of
the economic regulation mechanism, is a reformed slot allocation process, probably
using slot auctions or trading systems, which would have major financial consequences
for airlines and passengers, but less certain impacts on airport revenues.
2.1.3 Hard infrastructure approaches
In discussing the provision of hard infrastructure, it has been argued that the uncer-
tainty of future demand [18] and the unpredictability of capacity degradation should
be considered [31]. Increasing local capacity can have major unforeseen wider im-
pacts, for example, because of the network effects of delays [32]. Trade-offs between
providing different types of capacity at departure, and capacity at arrival, have been
identified [33] and the relationship between runway and terminal capacity examined
[14], [34]. It has been contended that the runway capacity should be prioritised since
this is what causes bottlenecks for most airports [23], [24]. There is also the trade-off
between focusing on operational and commercial capacity and the extent of comple-
mentarity between these two different areas. This is affected by the choice of till
or cost allocation method used when setting prices, with the single till including all
airport activities compared to the dual till, when just the aeronautical aspects of the
operation are taken into account [35], [6].
Airports will have different incentives to invest, particularly if they are subject to
economic regulation. So-called ‘cost-based’ or ‘rate-of-return’ regulation can set in-
centives for excessive and too costly investment; price-cap regulation, whilst providing
incentives for cost efficiency, can be associated with under-investment. The situation
with light-handed regulation is not so clear [36].
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If the airport does invest, growing in size and evolving into a new type of airport
with different operations and/or traffic mix, there will be cost and revenue implica-
tions. Larger airports are generally able to provide a greater range of commercial
facilities and services, increasing the commercial spend (less than US $5 per square
metre for airports of less than 5 million passengers growing to excess of US $30 for air-
ports with more than 25 million passengers [37]. Leisure passengers have been shown
to spend more than business passengers [11], [9] with some evidence indicating that
LCC passengers spend less [9], [38].
Traffic mix changes will also bring associated costs, related to the service expec-
tations of the airlines, such as ensuring a fast transfer time for hub airports, or swift
turnarounds for LCCs. As regards airport size, evidence is mixed but generally it
shows that airports experience economies of scale, albeit with different findings re-
lated to if, and when, these are exhausted and if diseconomies then occur [39], [40],
[41]. As a consequence of these apparent cost and revenue disadvantages for smaller
airports, the European Commission (EC)’s view is that airports under 1 million pas-
sengers find it hard to cover all of their operating costs, let alone their capital costs.
At a size of 3-5 million they should be able to cover all their costs to large extent,
whereas beyond 5 million they should be profitable [42].
The costs of any additional capacity can be allocated to airport charges in different
ways. There may be a degree of pre-financing, unpopular with airlines, when certain
costs are covered in advance of the capacity becoming operational [43]. Research also
confirms the strong influence of market-oriented factors (price sensitivity, competition)
on pricing [44], [45]), [46], [47]. The airline’s responses to charge increases will depend
on their relative importance to overall costs, with LCCs arguably being the most
sensitive [48]. If charges are passed directly to the passengers, their own sensitivity will
reflect the typically quite small influence of charges on airline fares, and subsequently
their charges elasticity will be relatively small (estimated at Stansted to be less than
-0.15, rising to -0.2 to -0.6 after considering some degree to airport substitution [49],
suggesting a fairly marginal impact). However, the evidence is unclear as to the extent
to which airlines pass on changes in charges, or whether they choose to absorb at least
some of these, with a supply-side response to adjust capacity by making changes to
routes and schedules [50]. Irrespective of whether charges are passed on or not, airlines
may see their profit margins reduced, because any supply response will involve lumpy
reductions in airline capacity, having considerable impacts on the passengers [51]. This
is an example of the wider impacts of capacity provision, which, as with delay impacts,
can intuitively be understood but are difficult to support with empirical research.
In summary, this literature review has identified many of the key potential trade-
offs relevant to this research. It has discussed the implications of delays at airports and
the various approaches different airports can adopt to increase their capacity. It has
considered key airport management issues such as non-aeronautical revenue generation
and service quality. This has helped to provide the research context, and to inform
16
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the model where comparisons are made of the marginal costs of extra airport capacity
with the increase in demand due to decreased delays. The review has also covered
the complex area of airport charging/economic regulation and the wider consequences
for airline network planning, identifying the difficulties involved with including such
factors in any trade-off analysis. The overall discussion has enabled an assessment to
be made of the main variables commonly used in the literature, for example related
to aircraft movements, passengers, airport characteristics and capacities, which has




Eleven sources of data have been considered and acquired.
Data management included data cleaning and small extrapola-
tions, as well as cross-checks for plausibility. Data acquisition
and consolidation comprised a large effort within the project.
One of the most intensive efforts of the project has been dedicated to data acquisition,
cleaning and consolidation. In order to have a model which could be calibrated as
much as possible, different kinds of data have been collected. Table 2.1 shows a
summary of the data collected, with a brief description of their use.
The reference year for the analyses is 2014, this being the most recent year for
which the data required were most generally available. A major component was air-
port financial and operational data sourced (through subscription) from FlightGlobal
(London, UK). ATRS (Air Transport Research Society; USA and Canada) bench-
marking study data were purchased, in addition, particularly for the provision of
complementary data on airports’ costs and revenues. At the time of analyses, only
ATRS data for 2013 were available, and these selected data were used as a proxy
for 2014. Financial and operational data were compared with in-house, proprietary
databases, with adjustments made as necessary. Data on airport ownership, and ad-
ditional data on passenger numbers, were provided by Airports Council International
(ACI) EUROPE (Brussels). European traffic data were sourced from EUROCON-
TROL’s Demand Data Repository (DDR) with delay data primarily from the Central
Office for Delays Analysis (EUROCONTROL, Brussels). Note that, importantly, local
turnaround delay is used throughout this work, as this reflects airport in situ effects,
whereas air traffic flow management departure delay is generated due to en-route de-
lay, or delay at the destination airport - i.e. it is attributable to remote effects. We
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Source Typical Content Use
FlightGlobal
Number of flights, number










Full trajectories of aircraft
for one month of data
Delay distribution,








ACI Ownership airport Not used in final analyses
Private communication,
EUROCONTROL (2016)
Coordination of airport Not used in final analyses










Maximum Take-Off Weight Cost of delay calibration
University of Westminster
[3]
Cost of delay Cost of delay calibration
Table 2.1: Data sources, content, and use.
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did not have access to clean, local (airport generated) air navigation service (ANS)
delay data. Other in-house sources of data were used in addition to those listed, also
drawing on the literature review.
Considering the wider context of operations in 2014, there were 1.7% more flights
per day in the EUROCONTROL statistical reference area, compared with 2013. The
network delay situation remained stable compared to 2013, notwithstanding industrial
action, a shifting jet stream and poor weather affecting various airports throughout the
year, particularly during the winter months [52]. The average delay per delayed flight
demonstrated a slight fall relative to 2013, and operational cancellations remained
stable ibid. We return to the issue of industrial action shortly.
In the absence of access to a single, comprehensive source of passenger quality of
service data, airports were assigned an overall passenger satisfaction ranking for 2014,
initially based on Skytrax “The World’s Top 100 Airports in 2014” ranking data1, and
then adjusted according to independent reviews by two experts, in addition to some
limited inputs from ACI (Montreal, Canada) drawing on its Airport Service Quality
[15] programme data. On this basis, the airports were allocated to a ‘top’, ‘middle’
or ‘lower’ ranking. Notwithstanding fairly extensive industrial action in 20142, clearly
impacting a number of passengers at specific airports, it is difficult to assess the col-
lateral (confounding) impact of such events on corresponding passenger satisfaction
scores for such airports. The final rankings derived cannot be shown due to confiden-
tiality restrictions. This new parameter derived by the team is one of many important
inputs informing the cluster analysis of 3.1.2.3.
To our knowledge, this is the first time that such a very wide range of data has
been synthesised in one database and used to characterise airport performance.
1http://www.worldairportawards.com/Awards/world_airport_rating_2014.html
2Air traffic control – Belgium: June, December; France: January, March, May, June; Greece:
November; Italy: December. Airlines – Air France: September; Germanwings: April, August,
October; Lufthansa: April, September, October, December; TAP Air Portugal: December.
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3 Model preparation and calibration
The modelling process is presented in this section, as well as the resulting model and
the calibration process.
3.1 Preparing for the modelling process
3.1.1 Using the literature review
The literature review has been used to inform the selection of the main mechanisms
and variables for the final model. These are detailed below:
• Airlines are affected by delays through compensation payments and duty of care,
as required by Regulation 261 [53], and through the loss of market share arising
from reduced punctuality.
• Passenger spending is not directly dependent on the delay at the airport, but
on overall passenger satisfaction.
• Airports create delays primarily by operating over or near their capacity thresh-
olds.
• Many airport charges are subject to economic regulation and thus charges cannot
generally be considered as a variable that the airport is freely able to adjust.
• Airport capacity is not a simple value, but rather a concept embedding sev-
eral complex and interrelated mechanisms (terminal, runway, gates etc.) and
uncertainty.
• Airports are quite diverse in terms of size, business models, types of airlines and
passenger profiles.
• Passenger demand drivers are exogenous to the airport.
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These considerations lead to several conclusions. First, it is important to have
a model which can be differentiated based on the type of airport considered (hub
airport, regional airport, etc.). Second, the impact of delay on the airport results
from airlines being less willing to operate a route because of the corresponding costs
they incur (and possibly as a shortfall in traffic too). Third, uncertainty means that
even levels of traffic under the theoretical airport capacity can imply some delay, and
that the mean average delay is not a sufficient measure for consideration. Fourth,
the modelling of the decision-making process of the airport cannot take into account
changes in airport charges, but merely comparisons of the marginal operational cost
of some extra capacity with the increase in demand due to decreased delays. Finally,
the passenger perspective should not be directly modelled, because passenger choice
of airport is largely independent of factors which can be influenced by the airport.
3.1.2 Using the data analysis
Summary
The data analysis supporting the modelling process is pre-
sented. A variable correlation matrix is studied, giving some
insights into the relationships between ‘extensive’ and ‘inten-
sive’ variables, infrastructure and traffic data, financial and
traffic data, etc. In order to reduce the complexity of the analy-
sis, a principal components analysis shows that the main driver
for variance is the size of the airport, followed by the airport
business model and the balance between aeronautical and non-
aeronautical revenues. A clustering analysis divides the main
airports into three communities, which are roughly consistent
with expert judgement.
3.1.2.1 Correlations
One of the challenges of constructing a comprehensive model for an airport is in
building causal relationships between a small number of core variables. The choice
of these core variables is determined by considering the dependencies of the different
variables on each other in the data. The first step is thus to compute the correlation
coefficients between each variables as these give the magnitude of the linear statistical
correlations. The table of correlations can be found in Annex A.1, as well as the
different variables considered and their meaning.
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Airport operating revenues are strongly correlated with several metrics, including
the number of passengers and the number of flights, which is expected, but also with
aircraft occupation (number of passengers per flight) and the number of passengers per
route, with correlation coefficients as high as 0.97. This is especially striking because
the latter metrics are not trivially linked to the number of passengers or flights, so it
is not a simple scaling effect. In fact, it shows how ‘extensive’ variables, i.e. scaling
with the number of passengers or flights, can interact with ‘intensive’ variables. These
effects are very important to capture, because intensive variables usually reflect the
fundamental organisation of the system, related to the interaction between different
agents (e.g. some kind of management rule). Regarding the precise meaning of this
correlation, it is not clear at this stage why the operating revenues should be so closely
related to these metrics, except if they are linked to some kind of capacity, as discussed
below.
More interestingly, some of the intensive variables, like aircraft occupancy, are cor-
related with the size of the airport (0.61). This is also expected since small airports
usually have more versatile functionality, which requires smaller aircraft for flexibility.
Other features are worth exploring. For instance, the proportion of intra-European
flights seems to be strongly (negatively) correlated with different variables, including
the total number of flights and number of gates (-0.77 and -0.65, respectively). This
was expected since intercontinental airports are also the largest ones. More impor-
tantly, total delays seem to be positively correlated with the number of runways, the
number of gates and the number of terminals (0.41, 0.58, and 0.45, respectively), i.e.
with the size of the infrastructure. This is because longer delays are expected at the
bigger airports, which have the largest infrastructure. On the other hand, the delay
per flight is less correlated with the infrastructure (0.38, 0.34, and 0.2). This is a good
sign, because it could mean that the airports increase their infrastructure to counter-
balance delays. It is also observed that runway and terminal usage have non-trivial
behaviour with respect to the number of runways and terminals, since they are weakly
or negatively correlated with them (-0.25 and 0.02), which could loosely mean that
average airports are ‘over-building’, i.e. the number of runways and the number of
terminals increase more quickly than the number of passengers. Note that, strangely,
the terminal usage increases (weakly) with the number of runways (0.25), whereas
the runway usage is quite independent of the terminal usage. This is the product
of a subtle co-evolution of different capacities, namely the terminal capacity and the
runway capacity.
Indeed, this is typically where simple correlation scores begin to show their limit.
It is not clear at this point what are the drivers of the different metrics and whether
a few causes only can explain most of the correlations. In order to explore this, we
turn now to principal components analysis (PCA).
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3.1.2.2 Principal components analysis
Since there are different types of airports, this is likely to have major consequences
that should be reflected in the model. Rather than relying on purely expert-driven
clusters, the clusters are defined in a data-driven way. In order to do this, a few
variables of importance in the data were selected, which are presented in Table 3.1.
We tried to select different types of variables with the most reliable data. Clearly,
some of the variables are correlated, as shown in the correlation table in Annex A.1.
In order to have a better picture, the decision was made to use PCA, reducing the
number of independent variables to four, while keeping 80% of the initial variance.
Abbreviation Short description
AO tot Number of airlines




minus costs of delay)
cap Runway hourly capacity
cht Share of low-cost carriers and charters
fsc Share of full-service carriers
delay per flight Delay per flight
delay tot Cumulative turnaround delay
exp tot Total yearly expenses
flight EU Share of European flights
flight per rnwy Flights per runway
flight per term Flights per terminal
flight tot Total number of flights
gate tot Number of gates
term tot Number of terminals
pax per flight Passengers per flight
pax tot Number of passengers
rev areo Aeronautical revenues
rev non area Non-aeronautical revenues
rnwy tot Number of runways
route tot Number of routes
sat Passenger satisfaction
Table 3.1: Variables used to characterise the airports.
Indeed, the objective of the PCA is to explain as much variance as possible in the
data, and this is generally a key indication of the quality of the solution. However,
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it is not acceptable to obtain a purely ‘mathematical’ solution in the analysis, i.e.
whereby the analyst is not able to assign real meaning to the factors, which may be a
challenge when there are too many of them. There is thus usually a trade-off between
the number of components and the amount of variance explained.
It is also often desirable to ‘rotate’ the factors, to increase loadings on some of the
original variables, and decrease them on others, in order to ease the interpretation of
the solution and improve its simplicity. Thus to allow for a better interpretation of
the results, we used varimax rotation. This is an orthogonal rotation method that
minimises the number of variables with high loadings on each factor [54].
After this procedure, the four new components – linear combinations of the ini-
tial variables – have the weights displayed in Figure 3.1. The new variables explain
Figure 3.1: Weights of the initial variables for each component.
approximately 46%, 9%, 14% and 9% of the variance, respectively. The remaining
variance (22%) can be explained by additional components, but the more we have,
the less they are individually significant. For instance, the next component only ex-
plains 5% of the variance. Presenting four components, explaining some 80% of the
variance of ∼30 initial components, is sufficient to draw reasonable conclusions, even
if their interpretation is not completely straightforward.
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The first component (labelled 0) is homogeneously composed of all initial vari-
ables, in particular the ‘extensive’ variables such as the total number of flights or the
number of delays. Hence, this first variable can be seen as the ‘size’ of the airport,
which appears to be the main driver of most of the initial variables, because this first
component accounts for almost half of the variance.
The second one (labelled 1) is clearly linked to the type of airlines which are
operating at the airport. Specifically, it seems that 9% of the variance is closely
related to the fact that airports serve more traditional/full-service carriers or more
low-cost carriers. It is also evident that the infrastructure is closely linked to this,
since the number of runways and terminals play a large role in this component too.
Interestingly, the component is related to the number of passengers per aircraft, which
is low when the component is low, i.e. when the airport is more ‘low-cost-oriented’
– in spite of pressures on these airlines to be punctual and have minimal turnaround
times. This is not unexpected, since low-cost carriers often operate smaller aircraft,
especially as they have very little long-haul traffic. It is also worth noting that the
delay per flight increases when the airport is more ‘low-cost-oriented’.
The third component (labelled 2) is related to the financial state of the airport,
with net basic utility and non-aeronautical revenues playing major roles. Interestingly,
the total number of runways has a positive impact on this component, whereas the
number of terminals has a negative effect. Since the capacity being measured is
linked to the air traffic movements, it is clear that it has an impact on the component
accordingly with the number of runways.
Finally, the last component (labelled 3) is linked to the physical infrastructure of
the airport, which affects its usage (number of flights per runway and per terminal),
but also the passenger satisfaction.
3.1.2.3 Clustering
Having defined a smaller number of variables with a clearer understanding of their
meaning, we now cluster the airports, gathering together the ones which are similar
in the same ‘community’. Note that in this part, the number of airports considered is
equal to 32, which are the airports for which all the fields of table 3.1 are informed.
Together, they represent more than half of the traffic in Europe in terms of passengers
(53%).
There are many different ways of clustering data, depending on the definition of
‘clustering’. Several methods are routinely used in the literature but the specific choice
of method is always quite subjective.
Indeed, the problem of clusterisation in community detection is mathematically
poorly defined. The main reason is that the definition of a ‘cluster’ or ‘community’
is subjective, and varies among the different fields in which it is used. As a result,
one should first define what one thinks would be the ‘right’ definition of a cluster
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in the particular context, before trying to find the right method. In this research,
we are interested in discovering whether some airports have similar behaviours. The
simplest and most accurate way of finding this, it is proposed, is through the use of a
Euclidean distance of their different characteristics, weighted by the PCA results. The
best definition of a cluster is then related to the probability of two airports being closer
(in terms of this Euclidean distance) to each other, than to the rest of the network.
This technique, from network theory (and based on modularity), thus presents itself
as being appropriate.
The details of the method can be found in Annex A.2. Here, we emphasise the
fact that the previous PCA was directly integrated with the clustering analysis, since
we used as distance between airports the Euclidean distance of the four components
of the PCA, each weighted with their ratios of variance explained. In the same annex,
we also show how we checked that the partition is robust with respect to uncertainty
in the data. This partition is presented in Table 3.2. Cluster 1 includes mostly major
hubs, whereas clusters 0 and 2 include airports with less traffic. Cluster 2 contains a
number of secondary hub airports.
In order to inspect the clusters more closely, we also show in Table 3.3 the aver-
age value of each of the airports’ characteristics, according to three categories: low,
medium and high. Upon inspection of the table, the difference between clusters 0
and 2 appear more clearly. Indeed, the first one includes airports which have pro-
portionally lower delays per flight, fewer routes, lower passenger satisfaction, fewer
flights, and less congestion (lower CUI value) with respect to cluster 2. The table
also confirms the status of ‘major hubs’ of the airports of cluster 1, with high num-
bers of passengers, numbers of flights, revenues and expenses. It confirms a tendency
of such hubs to attract non-low-cost carriers, to experience higher delays per flight,
and to have a more international profile. Interestingly, the passenger satisfaction is
also different in this cluster, although the average level cannot be disclosed (for rea-
sons of confidentiality). The net basic utility is not so high, however, probably driven
by higher delays per flight, whereas the load factor is high for major hubs, as expected.
The cluster analysis thus gives us a suitable basis on which we can build differenti-
ated models. In the following analysis, we use it to simplify some parts of the model.
Taking into account the full diversity of the airports is not necessary.
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Table 3.2: Composition of the partition from the clustering analysis. These
airports combined represent 53% of the traffic in number of passengers.
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0 1 2
AO tot L M M
CUI L M M
NBU H M H
cap L H M
cht M L M
delay per flight L M M
delay tot L M L
exp tot L M L
flight EU H M M
flight per rnwy L M M
flight per term L M L
flight tot L H M
fsc M H M
gate tot L M L
pax per flight M H M
pax tot L M L
rev aero L L L
rev non aero L M L
rnwy tot L M L
route tot L M M
sat * * *
term tot L L L
Table 3.3: Average value of each characteristic within each cluster (L=Low,
M=Medium, H=High). The average level of satisfaction cannot be disclosed
for confidentiality reasons, but are different in each cluster.
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3.2 High-level principles of the modelling process
Summary
Important mechanisms and variables are considered and jus-
tified in this section. Airport congestion creates delay for the
airline, and thus economic loss. An airline may decide not to
operate from the airport if the cost is too high. The airport
may increase capacity, which decreases the delay, but has an
operational cost. The revenues of the airport are dependant on
the number of flights (aeronautical revenues) and the number
of passengers (non-aeronautical revenues).
In this section, the model used for the final version is presented. The correspond-
ing equations, with some more details, can be found in Annex B.2. The model is a
simple functional model based on representative agents, with the following fundamen-
tal principles.
First, we use a functional relationship linking the delay at an airport with the
capacity and traffic. The progression is exponential (based on regression, see the cal-
ibration Section 3.3). The delay is then converted into a cost for the airline, based on
the average maximum take-off weight (MTOW) at the airport. The cost is quadratic
with the delay [3], which means that longer delays have proportionally higher costs
than shorter ones.
This cost then fixes the probability that the airline actually operates the flight,
through a probability function based on a hyperbolic tangent function. This choice is
motivated by the fact that this probability is linked to some form of utility function
for the airline, taking into account other (strategic) parameters (as described above).
It allows us to have a smooth function which varies continuously between 0 and 1, and
to have a ‘risk aversion’ of the agent which can directly be linked to the parameter s –
henceforth referred to as the ‘smoothness’ of the decision. Indeed, when s is sufficiently
small, the airline takes ‘harsher’ decisions, switching from operating to non-operating
the route once costs are driven high enough. This behaviour is illustrated in Figure
3.2. Note that, in fact, we should strictly be referring to the net revenue contribution
to the network, since airlines will tolerate loss-making legs that have a net benefit to
the system. This parameter is the only behavioural parameter of the model and the
only free parameter.
Note that the probability depends on the delay, which depends on the traffic, which
in turn depends on the probability itself. As a consequence, there is a need to solve
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Figure 3.2: Illustrative plot of the choice function. When the costs decrease in
absolute value, the probability of operating the flight increases towards 1. In
harsh decision conditions (s 1) the airline stops operating the route as soon as
the cost is non-zero.
an implicit equation in order to compute the delay (more details on this are to be
found in B.2.2).
Once the exact number of flights has been found, together with the correspond-
ing delay, the revenues of the airport are computed. There is an aeronautical part,
proportional to the number of flights, and a non-aeronautical part, proportional to
the number of passengers. The aeronautical revenue is simply the number of flights
actually operated multiplied by the revenue per flight, computed from data, and is
constant (although in reality aeronautical revenues are more complex being driven by
the number of flights, weight of the aircraft and passenger numbers). The second one
is the number of passengers – which in the model is the number of flights multiplied by
the average load factor, extracted from data – multiplied by the revenue per passenger
(also from data). This is fixed, too, as the (albeit limited) literature review showed
that passengers do not seem to spend more at the airport if they are delayed, only if
they have higher overall satisfaction, which is a constant here. Overall, it is important
to note that the total revenue per passenger is fixed in the model. Only the
number of flights change.
The net income of the airport is then obtained by subtracting the costs from
the revenues. The cost has a fixed part, which is directly taken from data (total
operational cost), and a part which changes with the capacity. For the latter, we use
a simple linear equation with the marginal operational cost of extra capacity. Note
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that this is not the cost of the infrastructure itself (e.g. runways, terminals), since
we are interested in the recurring costs only, and not fixed lump sums associated with
major investments.
Finally, in order to have an idea of the impact of delay on passengers, we com-
pute a utility function based on value of time, which is a function of the share of
business passengers at the airport. As an approximation for this, we use the share
of traditional/full-cost carriers at the airport, as opposed to low-cost, although it is
acknowledged that a growing share of business travellers now use low-cost carriers.
The model is not only based on average values, since one of the key features of
the cost of delay is its non-linearity with the delay. As a consequence, we use certain
distributions for the traffic and integrate the other values of the model with the traffic.




The model’s calibration is presented. Data are used in three
ways: (i) directly estimating input parameters for the model;
(ii) extracting functional relationships from the literature or
data regression; (iii) tuning input parameters by matching an
output metric of the model to a target value from the data.
The fully calibrated model has only two free parameters: the
marginal operational cost of additional capacity and an internal
behavioural parameter. The results are not strongly dependant
on the latter, and it could in principle be post-calibrated using
the average delay returned by the model. The first parameter
should be considered as a variable, or be precisely estimated for
individual airports.
Here we describe how we calibrate the model. The calibration itself is performed in
various steps. Indeed, some parameters can be calibrated directly from the data, but
some need to be swept, matching an output of the model to the corresponding value
extracted from data. Moreover, we need different functional relationships coming
directly from data.
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3.3.1 Functional relationships
The first functional relationship we use is the one between the traffic and the delay.
In order to compute it for each airport, we used DDR data, with the use of the
difference between M3 (actual, radar-tracked flight) and M1 (last-filed flight plan)
departure times as an approximation for the real delay. In appendix B.1.1, we study
the potential difference between these delays and the real ones, that are only available
at an aggregated level from CODA data (and not throughout the day). We use one
month of data, and we compute the number of departures during each hour of each
day, as well as the corresponding mean delay. We then average them over the whole
month of data and for each airport, and perform an exponential fit. There are only
two parameters to the fit, one of them being a measure of the capacity. Finally, the
airports were gathered according to the three clusters found in Section 3.1.2.3, which
means that we use only three relationships in total.
The passenger costs cover compensation and duty of care, as required by Regu-
lation 261 [53], and also reduced market share costs arising from poorer punctuality
(they do not include (internalised) passenger value of time costs). The delay costs
are sourced from [3]. Based on this source, we carried out a regression fit for primary
delay (to avoid double-counting across the network by including reactionary impacts)
costs using the weights of the aircraft and the delay durations. The final function is:
cd = −7.0 δt− 0.18 δt2 + (6.0 δt+ 0.092 δt2)
√
MTOW, (3.1)
For the model, we set
√
MTOW to its average across all aircraft departing from the
airport.
In this equation, the delay should not be an average one, but the actual delay of
each flight. This is a potential issue for the model, given that we are using average de-
lays (per hour). Indeed, it is clear, for instance, that a null average delay still produces
a cost, since some flights are still delayed, and thus bear a cost, whereas airlines with
flights ahead of schedule are assumed not to benefit financially (they may even suffer
costs). Moreover, the cost is super-linear with the delay, which means that long delays
cost proportionally much more than shorter ones. As a consequences, we used DDR
data to compute the intra-hour distribution of delays. These distributions are fitted
with log-normal distributions (see Annex B.1.3), which is a suitable approximation,
even though very long delays are sometimes underestimated. The previous equation
is then corrected, using the expected values of the cost, based on the probability
density of delays. This procedure is undertaken airport by airport, increasing the
total real cost. Note that, in particular, the expected cost of delay for a null average
delay is not null any more.
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3.3.2 Direct calibration of parameters
Some parameters can be directly estimated from the data, for each airport:
• The load factor lf is given by the ratio of the number of flights and the number of
passengers (this is not the real average load factor which would need to consider
each flight separately).
• The (average) aeronautical revenues per flight P are given by the total aeronau-
tical revenues divided by the number of flights.
• The (average) non-aeronautical revenues per passenger w are given by the total
non-aeronautical revenues divided by the number of passengers.
• The distribution of traffic {T} through the day is fixed by averaging one month
of data, splitting the day into 24 hour periods.
The value of time for all passengers, not useful per se for the model but impacting
on passenger satisfaction, can be found in the literature. To have a more realistic
description, we decided to use two values of time, which are usually associated with
business (vb) and leisure passengers (vl), sourced from [55]. We then consider that
most passengers on low-cost carriers have a lower value of time – often associated with
leisure trips – whereas passengers travelling with traditional/full service airlines have
a higher value of time, reflecting more business trips. As a consequence, the average
value of time in our model is:
v = vlrlcc + vb(1− rlcc),
where rlcc is the share of low-cost carriers at the airport. This value is also directly
taken from data (i.e. DDR data). Note that this is a very crude approximation, since
many business-purpose trips are made on low-cost carriers, for example. However,
since precise passenger profiles are not currently available to the research team, this
is a reasonable approximation, and better than simply considering as equal business
and leisure passenger volumes across all flights.
Finally, an important parameter is the marginal cost of extra capacity per pas-
senger α. This value is quite difficult to extract from data, so we consider it as a
free parameter most of the time. However, in order to have an approximate idea of
its value, one can assume that the main objective of an airport is to deliver capacity,
and thus all of its costs should be related to this delivery. A regression of the total
costs is thus carried out (outlay on infrastructure, such as a new runway) for the
various airports, as a function of capacity. A linear regression is reasonable in this
case (R2 = 0.53) except for the high cost airports (essentially CDG, LHR, and FRA).
The cost is thus around 24 000 euros per unit of capacity per day. This corresponds
to 220 euros per passenger, per day, taking CDG as an example.
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3.3.3 Post-calibration of parameters
We call post-calibration the operation of running the model with different values of one
or more parameters, and comparing an output of the model to some values extracted
from the data.
With the final version of the model, we only need to post-calibrate one parameter
(β), tuning the demand at the airport. More specifically, it is a multiplicative factor for
the traffic. When calibrating this, we match the effective number of flights operated at
the airport with the real ones in the data, sweeping the value of β. After calibration,
β is usually a value greater than 1. Indeed, we need to increase the traffic volumes
obtained from data, since the probability that the airline operates the flight is smaller
than 1. In other words, we compensate for the disincentive of airlines (i.e. due to the
cost of delay) associated with an increase in demand, in order to match the observed
number of flights.
3.3.3.1 Summary of calibration
In summary, the calibration includes the following steps:
• Maximum take-off weight MTOW is included in the cost-delay relationship.
• Average load factor lf , aeronautical revenues per flight P and non-aeronautical
revenues per passenger w, value of time v, total initial cost cinit, and distribution
of traffic {T} through the day are taken directly from data.
• Fitting parameters cc and Cinit (the latter being the capacity) for delay-traffic
load relationship are set.
• Cost of delay relationship is corrected based on intra-hour log-normal fitting
distributions of delays.
• Demand factor β is post-calibrated by matching of the number of flights with
the data.
The ‘total initial cost cinit’ represents the total current costs of the airport, i.e. costs
for providing the current capacity. Finally, we have two parameters remaining, the
smoothness of the airline decision s and the marginal cost of capacity α, which is the
operational cost of running one extra unit of capacity. The latter could be estimated,
for instance, with the current cost per passenger, but we prefer to keep it as a variable,
since the exact figure is likely to be different from just ‘capacity/passengers’.
The smoothness is thus the last free parameter of the model. It represents the
sensitivity of the airline to the cost of delay. The higher it is, the smoother the
decision will be, i.e. the airline will not suddenly cease operating at an airport when
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the cost increases. When the decision is harsh (low value of s), the airline ceases to
operate the flight as soon as the cost is non-zero.
It is clearly linked to the elasticity of demand (associated with the airline) and the
cost (of the airline operating a flight at the airport), which is very hard to estimate
because of lack of detailed airline data. It is worth noting, however, that:
• a basic sensitivity analysis (see Annex C) shows that the results of the model
do not depend strongly on the value of s,
• the parameter is actually not totally free, but is constrained at low values. This
comes from the fact that a low elasticity cannot fulfil demand requirements.
As a result, the model is only slightly over-fitted and thus suitable for the task.
In Table 3.4, we present a summary of all the parameters1 and their types, corre-
sponding to the ways that they are calibrated.





MTOW Max. take-off weight DC 120 euros
lf Load factor DC 271 pax/flight
P Airport charges DC 2393 euros
Cinit (Departure) capacity DC 35.59 flights
cc Delay at zero traffic DC -1.83 minutes
v Value of time DC 39.91 euros
T Distribution of traffic DC (distribution)
w Average revenue per passenger DC 17.78 euros
cinit total initial cost DC 3.3m euros
β Traffic multiplier (demand) PC 3.45 (no units)
α Marginal cost of capacity FP –
s Smoothness FP –
Table 3.4: List of parameters of the model, with their types related to calibration.
DC: Direct calibration, FP: Free parameter, PC: Post-calibrated. The last column
presents the value obtained for the calibration with the selected airport.
Once the model is calibrated, it is possible to change some of the parameters to
see the impact on other variables, as is demonstrated in the next section.
1This list of parameters is different from the metrics considered in the data analysis section.
Indeed, only those parameters were selected that could be included in the model and calibrated.
Many of the parameters of the data analysis were included at first in the model, but were then
removed as progress was made to a fully calibrated model.
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4 Model implementation and results
4.1 Implementation
Summary
The model is implemented in Python and uses a MATLAB
graphical user interface (GUI) for user-friendly interactions.
The user can change the values of different parameters, and the
output representation, for a seamless experience of the model.
4.1.1 Engine implementation
The model is written in Python and is divided into two parts. The first relates to the
calibration, where relevant data are extracted from our sources and several operations
are performed to prepare the model, such as regressions. The output of this part is
a Python object embedding all the calibrated parameters. The second part of the
code is the object itself, which is able to produce different outputs based on the free
variables passed in the inputs. The output is then used by the graphical user interface
(GUI), described below.
4.1.2 Graphical user interface (GUI)
The model developed is aimed at experts in air transport, that do not necessarily
have the technical or programming skills to execute or modify a software platform.
In order to make the model more accessible, a visualisation layer, or GUI, has been
developed on top of the data-driven, ‘back-end’ model (engine). The model is then
delivered as an autonomous piece of software usable without programming skills.
This visualisation helps the user to understand the underlying model behaviour
and evolution when varying certain input parameters and airport types, for example
determining the combination of parameters that lead to desirable outputs or, in some
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cases, optimum values. The visualisation tool also helps to determine the stability
and sensitivity of the optimal points, the local behaviour in small neighbourhoods,
visually.
Figure 4.1: Screenshot of the visualisation layer.
The engine has been developed in MATLAB and can be deployed on Windows, Mac
and Linux platforms. It is packed as a MATLAB standalone application. Therefore, a
licensed copy of MATLAB is required. If not available, MATLAB runtime needs to be
installed. (Instructions for installing MATLAB standalone applications and runtime
libraries can be found at [56].) The engine is compatible with modules (airport and
airline models) written either in MATLAB or Python programming languages and
exports output data into common formats: .png for figures, plus .xml and Excel-
compatible .csv files for tables. Although the visualisation layer has been developed
as intuitively as possible, embedded in the software, there is a user manual to facilitate
the use of the GUI. It can be accessed from the ‘Help’ menu at the top right-hand
corner of the application window, as shown in Figure 4.2.
Source codes are stored in a private and secure GitHub repository. GitHub is an
online control version repository with collaborative capabilities. Updates, bug fixes
and new versions of the model will be released beyond the current project. Snapshots
as a MATLAB standalone application could be made on demand. The source code
will be hosted and maintained indefinitely.
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Figure 4.2: Help menu.
4.2 Calibrated model results
Summary
The model calibrated on a large, European hub airport shows
the presence of an optimum in capacity greater than the current
capacity, for a wide range of marginal operational costs. At the
optimum, the mean delay has fallen by approximatively 5% and
the passenger utility has increased by the same amount. When
calibrating different airports, one can compare the maximum
operational cost for which a given increase is profitable to the
airport. As expected, bigger airports can, in general, sustain
greater extra operational cost, in particular because they are
the most congested. However, the number of passengers is not
the only factor, and some large airports cannot sustain high
operational costs.
4.2.1 Calibrated airport
We have two free variables. The first is the new capacity C targeted by the airport,
and the second is the marginal cost of capacity α. All other variables have been
calibrated, as described previously.
Figure 4.3 shows the net income of the airport when changing these two variables.
The global maximum is clearly reached when the marginal cost is null and the capacity
is at its maximum value. It is interesting that, for a given value of α, there are two
possibilities: either there is a maximum in capacity, or there is not. Indeed, for a
small value of α, when the capacity increases, the net income also increases, up to a
certain point, after which it starts decreasing. This is because increasing the capacity
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decreases the delay, and more flights are operated. However, in contrast, the income
per passenger decreases with capacity, as we explain below.
Figure 4.3: Evolution of the net income of the airport as a function of the capacity
and the marginal operational cost.
In order to see this effect more clearly, we present various graphs in Figure 4.4,
where we have fixed α = 60k. Starting from the top left, graph (a), we first show the
revenues per passenger, which in our model is a constant. Indeed, only the number of
flights, and thus the number of passengers, change when the capacity is altered. Note
that in reality, there might be two different opposite effects related to this. On the one
hand, the non-aeronautical revenues have been found to be weakly correlated with
passenger satisfaction. As a result, increasing capacity may increase the passenger
satisfaction, and hence the non-aeronautical revenues per passenger. On the other
hand, it may be possible that some diseconomies of scale might occur when the airport
is handling more passengers and reaches a certain size threshold, as discussed in the
literature review.
Graph (b) shows the cost of capacity, which increases with the number of pas-
sengers. This is the case because increasing capacity by one unit does not bring all
the potential passengers, but only a fraction of them. As a result, the income per
passenger decreases with the capacity, as shown in graph (c).
In graph (d), we show that average delay decreases with capacity, which is the
main objective. As a consequence, the cost of delay for airlines decreases too (graph
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(e)), and the airport serves the demand better (graph (g)), with a higher number of
flights (graph (h)).
The relationships between the increase in the number of passengers and the de-
crease in the net income per passenger leads to a maximum for total net income
(at least for some values of α), see graph (i)). Finally, as average delay decreases,
passenger utility monotonically increases (i.e. with better satisfaction), see graph (j).
Figure 4.4: All results are expressed per day. Evolution of (a) revenues per
passenger, (b) cost per passenger, (c) net income per passenger, (d) average
delay per flight, (e) cost of delay per flight, (g) ratio between operated flights
and demand, (h) number of flights actually operated, (i) total net income of the
airport, and (j) passenger utility, as functions of the airport capacity.
4.2.2 Comparing different airports
In order to compare the different airports, we identify the value of α for which the
net income of the airport reaches a maximum, when the capacity is increased by 50%
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with respect to its current value. This gives a rough idea of the maximum marginal
cost at which it is profitable to increase the capacity. Table 4.1 show the results for
various airports, as well as some other metrics, for comparison. It is striking to see
how this typical marginal cost varies significantly among airports, from LPPR with
541 euros, to EGLL with 83 540 euros. This means, roughly, that an increase of 50%
of the capacity at Heathrow is profitable up to a marginal operational cost of 83 540
euros per day per unit of capacity. On the other hand, an increase of 50% of the
capacity for Porto airport would be profitable only if the marginal operational cost
were below 541 euros per day.
C α Pax (millions) CUI
EDDF 37.6 43087 59.6 0.54
EDDH 14.3 10404 14.8 0.49
EDDK 40.7 5106 9.45 0.53
EDDL 35.5 5106 21.9 0.49
EDDM 73.5 19038 39.7 0.52
EFHK 29.6 5586 15.9 0.44
EGBB 10.5 1424 9.72 0.45
EGCC 14.9 3409 22.1 0.47
EGKK 20.2 6127 38.1 0.61
EGLL 28.7 83540 73.4 0.59
EGSS 17.5 7148 19.9 0.49
EHAM 50.2 29615 55.0 0.53
EIDW 45.5 4085 21.7 0.59
EKCH 45.0 8477 25.6 0.49
ESSA 30.8 3179 22.5 0.53
LEMD 29.9 17687 41.8 0.55
LFPG 41.3 53073 63.8 0.54
LGAV 13.1 7014 15.2 0.44
LIRF 288.9 8323 38.5 0.51
LOWW 34.3 8784 22.5 0.46
LPPR 4.7 541 6.93 0.37
LPPT 16.5 2234 18.1 0.49
LSZH 26.1 8630 25.4 0.53
LTBA 12.8 3179 56.7 0.67
Table 4.1: Capacity, typical marginal cost for which an increase of 50% of the
capacity is profitable, number of passengers and capacity utilisation index for all
calibrated airports.
It is interesting to see that this threshold seems to be highly correlated with the
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size of the airport (see Figure 4.5), in a quite non-linear way (the initial analysis shows
that it is compatible with a power law). This could be related to economies of scale
as discussed in the literature review.
Figure 4.5: Threshold of the marginal cost of capacity for which an increase 50%
of the capacity is profitable for different airports.
4.2.3 Effect of parameters on the position of the optimum
In this section we examine the effect of the various parameters on the position of the
optimum. Since all the parameters are calibrated, or considered as variables, some
parts of the calibration procedure are relaxed to allow some of the parameters to vary.
The first parameter that we are interested in is the load factor. As highlighted in
the literature review, the average load factor at airports has been increasing in recent
years, except at highly congested airports. The main reason is that this is a relatively
cheap way of increasing their effective capacity. As a consequence, many of them try
to find incentives for airlines to increase the size of their aircraft.
In the calibrated model, the load factor lf is derived simply by dividing the total
number of passengers by the total number of flights for a given airport. Here, we relax
this calibration and sweep the parameter, every other parameters being unchanged.
This load factor in our model has a very simple effect: it increases the non-aeronautical
revenues linearly. As a consequence, the optimal capacity is shifted, as shown in Figure
4.6. The figure shows the optimal capacity as a function of the load factor.
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Figure 4.6: Optimal capacity as a function of the average load factor.
For low load factors, the optimal capacity is at the current capacity or below (by
design, here the capacity cannot fall below the current value). At a certain point, the
load factor is high enough, and the optimal capacity starts to increase linearly with
it. This simple effect is due to the fact that higher load factors act as a “free” increase
in capacity, and thus the airport has less need to increase actual infrastructure.
The second interesting feature that we study is the effect of predictability when
punctuality is fixed. In other words, the effect of the variance of the delay when the
mean delay is fixed. To simulate this effect, we change the ’correction term’ of the cost
of delay function, reducing progressively the variance of the log-normal distribution
while keeping a constant mean.
First in Figure 4.7, we show the impact of decreasing predictability on the cal-
ibrated model with the current capacity, for different metrics. The right-hand side
of each graph corresponds to the situation in the data, i.e. a normalised standard
deviation of 1. The extreme left-hand side corresponds to a perfectly predictable sit-
uation, but not perfectly punctual. This last limit is not very realistic and the model
probably fails in this region, due to the fact that in reality airlines would integrate a
simple off-set of departure times into their objective functions.
Nevertheless, moderate increases of predictability (decreases of standard deviation)
are probably well captured by the model. Unsurprisingly, the net income starts by
increasing when the standard deviation falls. This is due to the fact that it is less
costly for airlines to operate at this airport, and thus they are more willing to do so.
However, the net income is not monotonic - we return to this point later.
We first focus on the average delay at the airport. The counter-intuitive results
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Figure 4.7: Evolution of different metrics with the increase of the standard devi-
ation of delay at the airport (decrease of predictability).
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from the model indicate that increasing the predictability actually increases the mean
delay at the airport. Apparently, the airport trades the extra predictability against
some extra average delay, in some kind of mean-variance trade-off. In other words,
the airport can have a higher mean delay and still be more attractive to the airlines
because of the increase in predictability. Associated implications, such as those related
to strategic buffers, could be modelled in future.
Driving the standard deviation even lower, the airport reaches a maximum in
its net income, before this decreases slightly and then increases substantially. The
results for the extreme values are probably not reliable, but the moderately low values
could still be meaningful. To understand the latter properly, further study would be
required.
Figure 4.8: Optimal capacity as a function of the standard deviation of delay.
The consequences of this complex behaviour on the position of the optimal capacity
are quite difficult to predict. Indeed, as shown in Figure 4.8, the optimal capacity
does not vary monotonically with the predictability. When the latter increases, the
optimal capacity falls, reaching a minimum higher than the current capacity, before
increasing again. This is perfectly consistent with the fact that average delay first
increases with the predictability in Figure 4.7. Indeed, increasing predictability can
be seen here as an effective reduction of capacity.
These results shed light on a potentially deleterious effect relating to a reduction
of predictability, namely that the airport might react in such a way that punctuality
decreases.
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4.3 Exploratory results
Summary
The fully calibrated model has a very simple, constant non-
aeronautical revenue per passenger type. In this section, this
assumption is relaxed and more complex behaviours are ex-
plored. In particular, passengers can now shop more when they
are delayed, but since their satisfaction decreases, they might
spend less per unit of time. Since there are no data supporting
the calibration of this part, the potential impacts are illustrated
by choosing some ad hoc functions. The results show that sev-
eral optima in capacity can occur for some values of the param-
eters. In particular, a small maximum can appear at low values
of capacity, whereas a higher one (more profitable) occurs at
larger capacity increases. This means that a risk-averse airport
could decide to reach only the first maximum instead of the
second one, thus not maximising its profit - leaving passengers
and flights with higher delays.
In this section, we slightly modify the model in order to explore its possibilities.
These results are less realistic, because they rely on more assumptions. In particular,
there are more free parameters, which are impossible to calibrate with the current
data. However, we include this part because it allows us to explore the missing
features of the model and their potential consequences.
The general feature we add to the model is the possibility of modifying the non-
aeronautical revenues per passenger. In particular, we decide to allow the passengers
to spend more at the airport: (1) if their flight is delayed; (2) if their overall satisfaction
increases. These two effects are opposite to each other (because the general satisfaction
should decrease when the delay increases), but it is quite likely that they do not cancel
each other out. Indeed, we assume here that with short delays the passengers spend
more at the airport, whereas satisfaction is likely to fall with longer delays. In order to
model this, we choose a linear dependence for the first effect, and a quadratic one for
the second. Hence, the typical revenues per passenger will look like the curve plotted
in Annex B.3, in Figure B.5. The exact equation we used is also shown in the annex.
In the following, we show some examples of what could happen with this effect, using
the calibrated airport.
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4.3.1 ‘Better shopping time’
It is first interesting to see what happens with only one effect or the other. In Figure
4.9, we show what happens when we include only the effect of changing satisfaction
levels. As expected, the revenue per passenger is now increasing with the capacity of
the airport (as passengers are more satisfied). This has the consequence of creating a
net income per passenger that first increases and then decreases, which is contrary to
the results obtained for the fully calibrated model. However, the effect on the total net
income of the airport is qualitatively null. If the maximum is clearly shifted towards
higher capacity, resulting in higher net income, there is still only one maximum, as
previously highlighted for the fully calibrated model.
Figure 4.9: Different outputs of the models with satisfaction effect (see caption of
Figure 4.4 for the meaning of each graph). These plots have been obtained with
the following values of free parameters: te = 0, se = 1500, cap = 24, α = 40000.
4.3.2 ‘Longer shopping time’
When disabling the effect of satisfaction and keeping only the ‘more shopping time’
effect, the results for net income are again quite similar (not shown here). Indeed, the
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revenue per passenger is now clearly decreasing with capacity, and since the cost is
increasing, the net income per passenger also decreases monotonically. As a result of
the increase in the number of flights, there is still a maximum for the net income, which
is clearly shifted towards the low capacities this time. Note that this is interesting per
se, because in this case the airport has much less incentive to increase capacity.
4.3.3 Both effects
Finally, we run the two effects at the same time. Figure 4.10 shows the same type
of plots as before, which are now more complex. First, the revenues per passengers
are no longer monotonically decreasing. At first, the increase in capacity shortens
the shopping time and decreases the revenues, but then the increase in satisfaction
takes effect and the revenues increase again. The effect on the income per passenger
is dampened by the costs, and thus still monotonically decreasing. However, the
relationship between the revenues per passenger and the number of passengers, creates
an interesting pattern for the total net income. Indeed, this first increases slightly
because of the rise in passengers, which is strong at the beginning, then decreases
because the revenues per passenger fall. It then increases again when the satisfaction
effect exerts itself, and finally drops for high capacities: being significantly affected by
the cost of capacity. This is an interesting pattern, because it means, for instance, that
the airport could be trapped in the first, local, maximum without sufficient incentive
to reach higher capacity, which is much more expensive in terms of investment.
The important conclusion of this section is that the modification of the revenues
per passenger, which is clearly linked to the economic efficiency of the airport, can
blur the picture drawn by the fully calibrated model and create some local maxima
for the expected net income of the airport. More specific studies would be needed to
discover if one effect or the other – or both – is more likely to happen in reality. It is
important to note that aeronautical revenues are not considered here because of the
complexities identified in the literature review.
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Figure 4.10: Different outputs of the models with both effects (see caption of
Figure 4.4 for the meaning of each graph). These plots have been obtained with
the following values of free parameters: te = 20, se = 1500, cap = 24, α = 40000.
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5 Conclusions
The work presented in this deliverable aimed at producing a new, highly data-driven
model able to give quantitative insights into the costs and benefits of extra capacity
at an airport.
Technically, one of the most difficult tasks was the acquisition of data, and their
consolidation. Indeed, it took a large amount of the effort just to acquire, clean,
extrapolate and consolidate the data. Most of the sources have been used one way or
another, but two severe limitations have hindered the modelling process.
First, the lack of times series is a problem when one tries to build causal relation-
ships, because correlations between different airports are typically less interpretable
than correlations in time for a single airport. Second, we were able to calibrate the
model only for a few airports, because there were several fields missing in the data for
most of them. An analysis of more airports, especially for the cluster analysis, would
have allowed us to differentiate the model better, based on different types of airport.
A further main challenge was producing a model which can be calibrated, but
with enough realism to produce some quantitative outputs. Several tests have been
made (we have produced around 15 versions of the model in total), but the final one
was simplified as much as possible to allow a full calibration: only one free parameter
remains, which can be in fact roughly estimated, as shown in the sensitivity analysis
C.
However, if the model is functionally simple, it embeds potentially complex be-
haviour through the use of full distributions of delay and the corresponding expected
costs. In fact, special attention has been applied to the impact of the non-linearity of
the cost of delay, which can be taken into account only by using the full distribution
of delays (in our case, a log-normal fit for each airport and each hour of the day).
For the same reason, it was important for the model not to take for granted the basic
definition of airport capacity, but to use a data-driven relationship, which, in essence,
includes uncertainties regarding delays – with the consequence, for instance, that the
cost of delay is not null even when the airport is operating below its theoretical ca-
pacity threshold.
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Another advantage of a functional model is that it is very easy to modify and
to include different relationships, either for further exploratory research or for more
airport-tailored results. This was performed in the more exploratory part of the
results, where we showed that complex interactions may arise between time spent
shopping, passenger satisfaction, cost of capacity and satisfying demand – creating
different types of curves for net income. This, is turn, will likely influence the future
choices of the airport with respect to potential extensions of capacity.
However, it is clear that a functional model such as this one cannot capture all the
complexity of reality. For instance, compared to some other simulation-based models,
it is hard to introduce the feedback between different airports. Indeed, it is clear that
airlines make decisions at least on a two-airport basis (departure and arrival), and, in
some cases, model route impacts at the full network level.
Hence, airlines will react differently to an increase in capacity at a departure air-
port depending on the current state (and future, expected state) of the arrival airport.
An increase or decrease in delay will thus meet different reactions, based on the delay
at the other airport.
Another point not captured by our current model is the diversity of airlines. Not
all of them react in the same way to the cost of delay, because they have different
business models, different networks, different schedule buffers, etc. An operator such
as Ryanair, for instance, known to deploy large schedule buffers, may be more flexible
in terms of delay than some other operators, e.g. those operating connecting wave
structures at given airports (especially hubs).
The business models of the airports themselves will also attract different types of
operator, and increases in capacity will have different impacts on them. Stated more
generally, the heterogeneity of the different agents cannot be well captured by this
type of representative agents model.
Particular care has been taken regarding the choice of the right metrics and mech-
anisms to consider in the model, constrained by the data available. For example,
delay at an airport can obviously have many causes. Since it was desirable to capture
the delay directly caused by congestion, turnaround delay was focused upon. It was
also important to treat aeronautical and non-aeronautical revenues separately, since
they are two distinct sources that the airport can manipulate (to varying extents) to
maximise revenue. In particular, as seen in the exploratory analyses, airports may
have a strong incentive to increase delay in some cases.
We have demonstrated that the model can be easily calibrated on real data and
runs very well for the airports in our dataset. It produces reliable and realistic results.
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Some of them, in particular, are worth noting.
First, all the airports exhibit a maximum in net income as a function of capacity,
if the marginal cost of operating extra capacity is sufficiently low (as illustrated in
Figure 5.1). This threshold in the marginal cost is, however, rather different across
airports, and only a few airports can sustain a high cost of capacity. As expected,
these are the largest and most congested airports, which clearly need extra capacity.
Moreover, we have shown that this threshold is roughly consistent with the airports’
current operational cost of capacity, which means that they should be able to manage
this growth, subject to the availability of investment.
Figure 5.1: Illustration of optimum capacity at an airport.
The exploratory results show that the picture can be significantly modified by
the introduction of variable, non-aeronautical revenues per passenger as illustrated in
Figure 5.2. When tendencies to ‘shop more with more time’ and ‘shop better with
increased satisfaction’ are introduced, the net income can exhibit different maxima
and minima. The direct consequence is that an airport would probably not be willing
(or able) to invest sufficient capital to reach the global maximum, and is likely to be
‘trapped’ in a local maximum. Since an increase in capacity is incremental (e.g. new
runway, new terminal), this may actually render it impractical for the airport to reach
any maximum.
In future work, we hope to carry out a full calibration exercise on a specific airport.
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Figure 5.2: Complex landscape with local minima arising from the non-trivial
non-aeronautical revenues per passenger.
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A Data analysis
In this annex, we give some detail about the data analysis performed in support of
the modelling process.
A.1 Correlation structure
The full correlation matrix can be found in the next three pages. Table A.1 shows the
meaning of each of the variables:
Abbreviation Meaning
RegionE Share of European flights
Airlines Number of air operators
Routes Number of routes
Terminals Number of terminals
Gates Number of gates
Runway number Number of runways
Total pax Total number of passengers
Delay per flight CODA turn-around delay per flight
Avg pax/route Number of passengers per route
Net basic utility Net income minus aggregated cost of delay
Runway usage Number of flight per runway
Terminal usage Number of flight per terminal
Avg pax/flight Number of passengers per flight (load factor)
FLT DEP 1 Number of flights
turn delay Total turn-around delay
Capacity (hour) Maximum number of movements per hour
CUI Capacity utilisation Index
Peak hour vol Peak hour volume
Dom pax 2014 Number of domestic passengers
Int pax 2014 Number of international passengers
Public ownership Share of public share in airport
CHT% Percentage of charter flights
FSC% Percentage of full-service flights
LCC% Percentage of low-cost flights
REG% Percentage of regional flights




NetOpIncome13 Operational net income
Satisfaction Degree of passenger satisfaction at the airport
Coordination Degree of coordination of the airport
Low Aggregated market share of regional and scheduled flights
High Aggregated market share of low-cost and charter flights
Table A.1
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Routes -0.74 0.82 1.00
Terminals -0.39 0.54 0.46 1.00
Gates -0.65 0.74 0.78 0.32 1.00
Runway number -0.14 0.29 0.21 0.28 0.18 1.00
Total PAX -0.72 0.80 0.90 0.49 0.78 0.25 1.00
Delay per flight -0.52 0.53 0.63 0.34 0.38 0.20 0.60 1.00
Avg pax/route -0.02 0.12 -0.06 0.16 0.17 0.07 0.16 0.11 1.00
Net basic utility 0.17 -0.05 -0.42 -0.15 -0.27 -0.28 -0.36 -0.33 -0.17 1.00
Runway usage -0.61 0.41 0.64 0.10 0.58 -0.25 0.67 0.36 0.28 -0.14 1.00
Terminal usage -0.61 0.63 0.78 0.02 0.69 0.25 0.78 0.31 0.19 -0.27 0.50 1.00
Avg pax/flight -0.45 0.34 0.52 0.25 0.35 0.12 0.61 0.42 0.56 -0.10 0.35 0.43 1.00
FLT DEP 1 -0.77 0.74 0.91 0.36 0.73 0.43 0.98 0.58 0.45 -0.42 0.68 0.68 0.48
turn delay -0.72 0.71 0.83 0.45 0.58 0.41 0.91 0.80 0.37 -0.45 0.56 0.53 0.47
Capacity (Hour) -0.71 0.84 0.90 0.49 0.80 0.29 0.94 0.59 0.17 -0.49 0.63 0.79 0.45
CUI -0.59 0.70 0.77 0.38 0.69 0.16 0.75 0.47 0.21 -0.19 0.63 0.70 0.54
Peak hour vol -0.72 0.85 0.90 0.49 0.81 0.29 0.94 0.58 0.17 -0.49 0.63 0.79 0.45
Dom pax 2014 -0.56 0.52 0.61 0.27 0.52 0.14 0.69 0.10 0.11 -0.21 0.38 0.64 0.44
Int pax 2014 -0.74 0.79 0.88 0.48 0.76 0.25 0.98 0.63 0.14 -0.35 0.63 0.76 0.56
Transfer pax 2014 -0.66 0.54 0.74 0.38 0.62 0.42 0.90 0.50 0.66 -0.55 0.50 0.64 0.49
Public ownership 0.19 -0.10 -0.11 0.11 -0.03 0.12 -0.10 -0.22 0.06 -0.25 -0.12 -0.10 -0.16
CHT% 0.20 -0.09 -0.18 -0.06 -0.16 -0.08 -0.12 -0.21 0.43 0.07 -0.10 -0.12 0.09
FSC% -0.42 0.45 0.36 0.28 0.42 0.18 0.42 0.39 0.05 -0.26 0.30 0.37 0.10
LCC% 0.13 -0.17 -0.01 -0.09 -0.10 -0.08 -0.10 -0.08 -0.08 0.21 -0.06 -0.03 0.34
REG% 0.15 -0.15 -0.18 -0.13 -0.16 -0.05 -0.17 -0.20 -0.14 0.08 -0.20 -0.20 -0.37
OTH% 0.20 -0.29 -0.30 -0.17 -0.29 -0.06 -0.30 -0.38 -0.14 0.09 -0.29 -0.29 -0.58
TotalAeroRev13 -0.67 0.58 0.58 0.37 0.58 0.24 0.80 0.47 0.76 -0.01 0.58 0.37 0.53
TotalNonAeroRev13 -0.64 0.56 0.72 0.39 0.52 0.36 0.85 0.57 0.67 -0.47 0.51 0.49 0.45
TotalOpExp13 -0.65 0.53 0.72 0.40 0.59 0.34 0.87 0.57 0.71 -0.57 0.55 0.49 0.46
NetOpIncome13 -0.61 0.57 0.50 0.34 0.45 0.20 0.71 0.40 0.67 0.22 0.53 0.33 0.47
Satisfaction -0.45 0.36 0.54 -0.02 0.50 0.24 0.53 0.30 0.48 -0.10 0.43 0.53 0.42
Coordination -0.18 0.51 0.49 0.28 0.41 0.18 0.42 0.44 0.07 -0.18 0.18 0.36 0.10
Low 0.21 -0.21 -0.09 -0.11 -0.17 -0.12 -0.15 -0.14 0.12 0.21 -0.09 -0.08 0.34
High -0.30 0.33 0.23 0.18 0.29 0.14 0.28 0.28 -0.05 -0.23 0.20 0.21 -0.07
Table A.3: Pearson correlation coefficients.
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FLT DEP 1 1.00
turn delay 0.91 1.00
Capacity (Hour) 0.97 0.89 1.00
CUI 0.78 0.66 0.79 1.00
Peak hour vol 0.97 0.88 0.99 0.77 1.00
Dom pax 2014 0.54 0.36 0.64 0.59 0.66 1.00
Int pax 2014 0.95 0.93 0.92 0.70 0.91 0.53 1.00
Transfer pax 2014 0.90 0.85 0.83 0.55 0.82 0.39 0.90 1.00
Public ownership -0.04 -0.10 -0.07 -0.09 -0.07 -0.06 -0.12 -0.10 1.00
CHT% -0.22 -0.21 -0.13 -0.07 -0.13 -0.16 -0.11 -0.16 -0.01 1.00
FSC% 0.63 0.57 0.46 0.34 0.47 0.33 0.41 0.58 -0.07 -0.21 1.00
LCC% -0.33 -0.29 -0.14 -0.05 -0.15 -0.05 -0.10 -0.31 -0.06 -0.14 -0.59 1.00
REG% -0.22 -0.22 -0.16 -0.18 -0.15 -0.07 -0.20 -0.24 0.10 -0.10 -0.29 -0.35 1.00
OTH% -0.40 -0.36 -0.29 -0.27 -0.30 -0.29 -0.28 -0.27 0.13 -0.09 -0.26 -0.16 -0.04 1.00
TotalAeroRev13 0.73 0.73 0.67 0.56 0.67 0.31 0.83 0.74 -0.10 -0.17 0.40 -0.23 -0.10 -0.36
TotalNonAeroRev13 0.84 0.89 0.80 0.54 0.80 0.29 0.89 0.90 -0.03 -0.21 0.51 -0.35 -0.16 -0.30
TotalOpExp13 0.85 0.88 0.83 0.56 0.83 0.34 0.90 0.93 0.03 -0.19 0.48 -0.31 -0.15 -0.33
NetOpIncome13 0.64 0.65 0.56 0.48 0.56 0.20 0.76 0.62 -0.16 -0.16 0.38 -0.24 -0.10 -0.29
Satisfaction 0.56 0.44 0.55 0.37 0.59 0.13 0.56 0.52 -0.24 -0.17 0.30 -0.06 -0.16 -0.35
Coordination 0.26 0.32 0.48 0.43 0.48 0.20 0.40 0.29 0.01 -0.03 0.08 0.04 0.02 -0.23
Low -0.37 -0.33 -0.20 -0.08 -0.20 -0.13 -0.14 -0.34 -0.06 0.32 -0.66 0.89 -0.38 -0.19


















































TotalOpExp13 0.80 0.97 1.00
NetOpIncome13 0.94 0.74 0.69 1.00
Satisfaction 0.50 0.51 0.49 0.47 1.00
Coordination 0.30 0.26 0.31 0.20 0.17 1.00
Low -0.26 -0.37 -0.34 -0.26 -0.12 0.02 1.00


























































































Table A.8: Significance statistical tests of correlation coefficients. All correlations






















































































































































Airport Economic Value D1.2
A.2 Clustering analysis
A.2.1 Methodology
There are many different ways of clustering data, each corresponding to the definition
of ‘clustering’. Several methods are routinely used in the literature but the specific
choice of method is always quite subjective. We decided to use a technique coming
from network theory, based on modularity. If we consider a network with an adjacency








(Aij − Pij), (A.1)
where Pij is the expected value of the adjacency matrix for the link i, j, and m is the
total weights of the links. The modularity is typically a measure of how much the
nodes are tightly linked to each other within the communities (clusters), with respect
to how much they are linked with the rest of the network. The null model for the
matrix is usually the one proposed by Newman and Girvan [57]: Pij = kikj/2m, which
corresponds to a randomisation of the links, conserving the local strengths. There is
then the need to find the partition P of nodes which maximises the modularity, and
for this several algorithms exist. Here we use the Louvain method, which is very
efficient and widely used [58].
It is well known that the modularity suffers from a resolution issue, but there is an
easy and elegant way to circumvent this, by adding a scaling term to the null model’s
matrix, i.e. Pij = γkikj/2m. If γ is high enough, typically very small communities
are obtained (down to the size of one node each). A small value means on the other
hand that the partition maximising the modularity is the one where all nodes are
in the same partition. In between, different levels of granularity of the system are
spanned. If there is again a certain degree a subjectivity in the choice of the right
scale, this is strongly guided by the appearance of plateaus in the number of clusters
when sweeping the scale – as shown below.
In order to use this method, the data must be organised in some type of network.
A typical approach is to define a degree of similarity – or distance – between airports.
Several choices are possible, but a common choice is to use the Euclidean distance on




(cki − ckj )2, (A.2)
where cki is the standardised value of the component k for airport i. The components
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are standardised as follows:
cki =
c˜ki −minj c˜kj
maxj c˜kj −minj c˜kj
, (A.3)
where c˜kj is the initial, absolute value of the component. This means that all compo-
nents span the interval [0, 1]. Note that different weights can also be put on different
components, to better reflect either their importance or some prior knowledge of the
data.
In this study we use the components of the PCA for the distances between airports,
instead of the initial variables, which reflect the natural organisation of the data.
Moreover, we use the relative variance weights of each component in the Euclidean




i − ckj )2, where wk is the ratio of variance explained
with component k.
In summary, we define a certain number of components (the same that we used for
the PCA), we build a network where each node is an airport and each pair of airports
has links of strength 1−dij, we sweep the parameter γ, and for each value we compute
the best partition with the Louvain algorithm. In the following subsection we show
the result of the procedure.
A.2.2 Analysis of clusters
The first step is to check if there are some scales for which the system has a non-trivial
number of clusters. Figure A.1 shows the existence of plateaus when sweeping the
scaling parameter, more specifically a plateau with three communities and another
one with four.
We then check that these plateaus actually correspond to stable partitions and not,
for example, to a sequence of different partitions with the same number of clusters.
We thus compute the normalised mutual information (NMI), which is a widely-used
measure of how alike two partitions are. We take several values of the γ within each
plateau, compute the NMI between each pair of the corresponding partitions, and
average these results. The NMI score ranges between 0 and 1, where 0 indicates two
totally unrelated partitions and 1 indicates that the partitions coincide exactly. In
other words, if the average NMI is 1, we conclude that the partition within each plateau
is unique, which is indeed the case here. Overall, this indicates ‘good’ partitions,
since they are stable in a finite range of the scaling parameters. Another check of the
relevance of the partition can be made by disturbing the data with some noise and
observing whether the new partition is similar to the undisturbed one. The procedure
applied is as follows: we first choose a level of noise (for instance α = 1%) and for
each characteristic of each airport, we modify its value by a factor drawn randomly
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Figure A.1: Number of communities in the network of airports as a function of
the scaling parameter. The presence of plateaus indicates the existence of natural
cluster structure at these scales.
between 1− α and 1 + α. We then recompute the partition (with the same value for
γ) and compute the NMI between this partition and the initial one.
In Figure A.2, we show the NMI as a function of the level noise applied to the data.
Clearly, for high levels of noise, the partitions are very different from the initial ones.
The fact that there is a small plateau for low levels of noise is a further indication
that the partition is quite robust. However, it is also clear that the clusters of the
initial partition do not differ greatly, since the NMI drops quite substantially after the
plateau. Overall, we can conclude that this partition is robust statistically speaking,
but that the characteristics of the airports tend to be continuous rather than harshly
categorical, which was as expected. Note also that a clustering analysis with many
different characteristics tends to produce these types of results, because of the variance
induced by each additional component.
We then inspect the partitions themselves. In Table 3.2 we display the composition
of the 3-cluster partition. We firstly compare this partition with the 4-cluster partition
(not shown), which is, in fact, very similar. The only difference is the presence of the
new cluster containing two airports, Copenhagen and Vienna, otherwise in cluster
number 2. Since the operational meaning of this small cluster is not obvious, we focus
in this study on the 3-cluster partition.
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Figure A.2: Average Normalised Mutual Information (NMI) between partitions
based on disturbed data and the original 3-clusters partition, as a function of
the level of noise applied to the data. The error bars represent the standard




B.1.1 The problem of delay
One of the core functions of the model is the relationship between delay and traffic.
It is clear that higher traffic lead to higher delays on average, however the link is not
so easy to infer. If at first we used some real delay distribution taken from CODA
data, we realised that we needed the full distribution of delays during the day1, which
is only available to us through DDR data. Unfortunately, DDR data only includes
M1 and M3 departures times, which means that we have only access to some delay
after regulation and updates from the airlines. In order to see if both delays were
closely related or not, we produced the plot presented in Figure B.1 (here for LFPG).
Fortunately, both distributions are not so far from each other. In fact, the main
differences are in the negative delay, essentially because a high negative delay from
updated flight plans turns into a null delay for CODA, which is fairly normal. The
second difference is the average value, which is around 9.5 minutes per flights in DDR
data and around 3.5 minutes in CODA data. We could have shifted the former to
match the latter, but decided that it would be lengthy to do for all airports, and is
not really meaningful. As a consequence, we decided to use the measure of delay from
DDR as it is in the following.
B.1.2 Delay and capacity
Once we had the above approximated measure of delay, we tried to link the delay
at an airport with the capacity and the traffic. In order to do this, we performed a
regression for each airport of the delay against the traffic, as described in Section 3.3.
Figure B.2 shows the evolution of the delay as a function of traffic for LFPG, and the
corresponding exponential fit. The fitted function has the form δ = 120(exp(Nf/C)−
cc), with cc and C being the two regressed parameters. C can be interpreted as the
1As highlighted in the main text and in the following, we need the full distribution because of the
non-linearity of the cost of delay for airlines.
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Figure B.1: Distribution of delays in CODA data (‘real’ delays) and DDR data for
LFPG. The data has been truncated in the [−15, 120] region (following truncation
from CODA data).
Figure B.2: Delay in seconds as a function of the traffic, for each hour of the day.
The solid line is an exponential fit.
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capacity, since it is the typical traffic for which the delay significantly differs from its
original value. cc is the delay when the traffic tends to zero, which is slightly negative
for most of the airports. Note that a linear fit is sometimes as good as an exponential
one, as shown below. Also the delays are still quite small (less than 10 minutes), since
they are averaged over an hour. We will tackle the issue of very high delays for airlines
in the discussion that follows. Finally, note that the exact resolution for the fit is not
obvious a priori, as our definition of capacity is now detached of any time period other
than the averaging window. To tackle this problem, we performed for each airport a
maximisation of the fit goodness by sweeping the resolution. Interestingly, the optimal
resolution is not the same for every airport, which may reflect different operational
choices.
Table B.1 shows the results of the fits for all the airports. For most of them, the
fit is good, except for a couple (LIRF and EIDW). In order to use the capacity in
the model, we rescale it to have the equivalent hourly capacity (Chour in the table).
Moreover, we decided to use the clusters found in the data analysis section in order
to get an average capacity. Indeed, it is quite clear that the fitted capacities fluctuate
significantly within one cluster, so we are more confident in using an average one,
since the airports in the same cluster should have similar operations. The last column
of the table show these averages, which are used in the model.
B.1.3 Cost of delay
The cost of delay is quite complex to assess, given the non-linearity of the cost as
a a function of delay, and of the large distribution of delay. The basic cost per
flight is shown in equation 3.1. However, the average delay in this equation cannot
simply be used in order to have the average cost. The easiest way to explain this
is to acknowledge that, even when the average delay is null, the average cost is not,
because some flights have a positive delay (i.e. arrive early) whereas others have a
negative delay and do not increase profits. As a result, a full distribution of delay was
considered.
In order to do this, and maintain a relatively simple model, we used a lognormal
fit of the distribution of delay. Since for each hour of the day, the distribution is likely
to differ, we fitted the distribution of delay of each hour independently. Note that we
used the whole month of data by aggregating each hour of each of the month. Figure
B.3 shows an example of a fit for 9.00 am for LFPG. The fit is far from perfect, but
roughly matches the data, and thus allows us to have a computation of the expected.




By performing this procedure for each hour of the day, the total cost of delay for
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Res. Cres cc R2 Cluster Chour Ccom
EBBR 74 28.296911 -1.429895 0.709285 2 22.943441 29.393561
EDDL 20 11.831204 -4.072900 0.617365 2 35.493611 29.393561
EGCC 81 20.052234 0.451433 0.642084 2 14.853507 29.393561
EIDW 94 71.311668 -3.025547 0.056397 2 45.518086 29.393561
EKCH 18 13.500190 -3.626090 0.870522 2 45.000634 29.393561
ENGM 46 26.990120 -0.837604 0.382568 2 35.204504 29.393561
ESSA 50 25.630759 -0.869383 0.564417 2 30.756911 29.393561
LOWW 29 16.600777 -1.437840 0.881326 2 34.346435 29.393561
LPPT 57 15.721970 -3.438412 0.732810 2 16.549442 29.393561
EDDF 35 21.956503 -2.452524 0.719974 1 37.639719 35.587806
EDDM 24 29.398295 -3.367913 0.599480 1 73.495738 35.587806
EGKK 46 15.507388 -1.136089 0.780133 1 20.227027 35.587806
EGLL 29 13.882645 -0.810045 0.821380 1 28.722714 35.587806
EHAM 46 38.471294 -2.787346 0.494721 1 50.179949 35.587806
LEMD 46 22.940405 -2.734194 0.521661 1 29.922268 35.587806
LFPG 47 32.313652 -1.483228 0.628944 1 41.251471 35.587806
LIRF 91 438.107591 -3.775606 0.000976 1 288.862148 35.587806
LSZH 70 30.412924 -2.072356 0.640382 1 26.068220 35.587806
LTBA 84 17.896407 0.334670 0.817061 1 12.783148 35.587806
EDDH 91 21.696123 -1.831217 0.522407 0 14.305136 17.813555
EDDK 22 14.923674 -3.962501 0.327822 0 40.700929 17.813555
EFHK 35 17.240393 -1.771224 0.660697 0 29.554959 17.813555
EGBB 53 9.316811 -0.074231 0.886582 0 10.547333 17.813555
EGSS 67 19.592047 -0.633787 0.544832 0 17.545117 17.813555
EPWA 80 17.771291 -2.708330 0.656717 0 13.328468 17.813555
LFMN 91 13.716757 -2.999108 0.840659 0 9.044016 17.813555
LGAV 74 16.173872 -0.549414 0.902492 0 13.113950 17.813555
LHBP 45 17.058659 -2.998551 0.496665 0 22.744879 17.813555
LKPR 63 21.392047 -2.366516 0.685793 0 20.373378 17.813555
LPPR 82 6.410945 -0.009339 0.322322 0 4.690935 17.813555
Table B.1: Results of the exponential fits of the delay against the traffic. The
first column is the resolution (in minutes) which gives the best fit. The second
and third columns are the corresponding values of the fitting parameters, and the
fourth one is the corresponding coefficient of determination. The fifth column is
the cluster ownership (as found in the data analysis part). The sixth column is
the capacity recomputed for one hour, which is the resolution of the model. The
last column features the average capacity in each cluster, which is taken as the
input by the model.
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Figure B.3: Histogram of the delays for LFPG at 9am, with a lognormal fit.
the airlines in one day is obtained by summing all the individual contributions. This
‘corrected’ cost is indeed significantly different form the cost of the average delay, as
shown on Figure B.4. Note that the correction itself depends on each airport, because
the exact distribution of delay also does. This is the curve we directly use in the
model.
B.2 Model implementation
In this section, we present the specific equations that we used in the model. The first
two equations we used are relate to the delay-capacity relationship and the cost of
delay, as presented previously. The other equations are detailed below.
B.2.1 Probability of operation
The core principle of the model is that the airline has a probability PA of operating a





where cd is the expected cost of delay computed along the lines presented previously,
and s is the smoothness parameter, discussed in the main text. This choice is moti-
vated by the fact that the probability is linked to some form of utility function for
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Figure B.4: Correction of cost of delay for airline. The blue points are the cost
of the average delay, the violet ones are the expected costs taking into account
the distribution of delay, and the solid red line is a quadratic fit of the latter.
the airline, taking into account other (strategic) parameters (as described above). It
allows us to have a smooth function which varies continuously between 0 and 1, and
to have a risk aversion of the agent which can directly be linked to the parameter
s – henceforth referred to as the ‘smoothness’ of the decision. Indeed, when s is
sufficiently small, the airline takes harsh decisions, switching from operating to non-
operating the route when the costs are driven high enough. Note that, in fact, we
should strictly be referring to net revenue contribution to the network, since airlines
will tolerate loss-making legs that have a net benefit to the system.
Moreover, we are able to introduce with this function an element of prospect theory,
in the sense that the utility of the airline does not depend only on its revenues, but
also on a pre-determined level r0 (some kind of ‘anchoring’), by using cd + r0 instead
of simply cd. This parameter could include the direct revenues from the passengers
(i.e prices of the tickets) and other costs linked to the operations. In the final version
of the model we decided not to use this parameter because it was hard to calibrate
and did not bring interesting features (we would need to consider a full distribution of
r0 for this, which is beyond the scope of this research). Finally, this function mimics
standard functions from prospect theory, since it is convex in the positive region (with
revenues greater than the value anchor) and concave otherwise.
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B.2.2 Implicit equation of delay
One important feature of the model is that it is auto-consistent for the delays, i.e. the
delays in the output are exactly the right level to match the actual traffic, which in
turn sets the average delay through the delay-capacity relationship. In other words,
setting a distribution of delays fixes the actual traffic through the use of probability
PA, which in turn fixes the delay at each hour of the day through the capacity-delay
relationship. In order to solve this circular issue, we need to solve the implicit equation:















using the corrected function cd of the delay, as described above. T is the demand traffic
for this specific hour, i.e. the traffic extracted from data multiplied by β, as explained
in the main text. This equation is solved numerically using the Brent method. The
convergence is assured by the fact that the right hand side is monotonically decreasing
with delay, and is strictly superior to 0 when δt = 0. So, there is always a solution,
and only one, which is why we use a local optimisation algorithm.
B.2.3 The airport
Regarding the airport, we assume that its revenues come from aeronautical revenues
and non-aeronautical revenues. The former depends on the airport charges P and the
potential number of flights operated N , with:
rA,aero = PNPA.
The latter is directly linked to the number of passengers:
rA,non-aero = lfwNPA,
where lf is the average load factor and w is the average revenue coming from each
individual passenger. In the final version of the model, the latter is a constant too.
Finally, we consider the expenses of the airport. Since we are interested in capacity-
related costs, we choose a very simple form for the cost, linear with the extra capacity.
The cost function reads:
cinf = α(C − Cinit) + cinit, (B.4)
where C − Cinit represents the increase in capacity desired by the airport, α is the
marginal cost per unit of capacity, and cinit is the initial total expense of the airport
– i.e. the expenses found in the data.
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In order to compare the consequences of the model for the different actors, we also
compute a utility for the passengers:
up = −vδt, (B.5)
where v is the average value of time of the passengers. This is a very crude approxi-
mation, and the computed utility has no intrinsic meaning, but is nevertheless useful
to compare different situations where delays are different and passengers are likely to
be satisfied at different levels. Note that we do not compare the results of the model
for different airports and thus the satisfaction coming from the airport does not need
to be estimated.
B.3 Exploratory analysis
This section shows some details of the results presented in 4.3.
The equation we used to modify the non-aeronautical revenues of the airport is
the following:
w(δt) = winit + wshop(δt) + wsat(δt).
It is composed of two components, plus the constant part winit, coming directly from
the calibration. The first one is increasing with δt, and represents the tendency of
people to spend more when they have more time (‘more shopping time’). The second
component is decreasing with δt and represents the tendency of people to spend more
when their satisfaction is higher (‘better shopping time’). Since we assumed that the
second component has an effect only when the delay is very high, whereas the first
one is present as soon as waiting increases, we use a quadratic and linear form for




















In these equations, δtinit represents the initial delay (the delay just after calibration).
te and se are the weights given to each component, and are considered as free pa-
rameters. Finally, we cap the value w, to avoid infinite revenues. The corresponding
variable is noted cap in the main text and is set to 24 euros to produce the results (to
be compared to the 17.7 euros after calibration).
As a result of this formulation, we are able to produce a non-trivial curve, shown
in Figure B.5, which in turns contribute to the net income curve shown in the main
text.
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Figure B.5: Evolution of the function w with the delay, with δtinit = 9.5, winit =
17.8, te = 15, and se = 1000.
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C Sensitivity analysis
In this annex, we briefly show the results of a sensitivity analysis performed on a
calibrated example of a large, European hub airport.
Since we have only one free parameter left in the model, we simply sweep it and
see how the calibrated parameters changes. In Figure C.1, we show the evolution of
the average delay in the output and the revenues of the airlines (in fact, only the cost
of delay, negatively counted). These two outputs are the ones which are of interest,
all others being fixed (e.g. the revenues per passengers) or trivially related to them
(e.g. the utility of the passenger). Both quantities are changing with the smoothness,
Figure C.1: Evolution of the average delay (left) and revenues of airlines (right)
in the calibrated model for various values of the smoothness parameter s.
but not drastically. For instance the delay goes from around 9 minutes per flight up
to 11.7 minutes, which is a fairly narrow window, even though it is not negligible.
It is worth noting that the actual value of the delay for the calibrated airport is 9.5
minutes in the data, which means in fact that we could calibrate this last parameter
to fit the average delay. We did not do it for technical reasons, but in the main text we
chose s = 500, which gives a delay close to 9.5. We are thus confident that the results
presented in the main text are sufficiently reliable with regard to the parameters.
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